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It is the world’s most successful, most powerful and most popular security alliance. 
Considering the number of countries waiting to get in, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization seems to have even more admirers than it can handle. But it also has 
an unexpectedly prominent and powerful critic: the president of the United States. 
 
As he has scolded NATO members over their defense spending and cast the 
alliance as a protection racket, Donald Trump has seemingly undermined an 
organization whose purpose and unity have rarely been questioned—and never 
before by an American president—since it was founded in 1949 as a bulwark against 
Soviet militarism.  
 
 
There was little doubt among Western democracies about the need for NATO 
immediately after the end of World War II. America’s European allies had largely 
demobilized, but the Soviet Union retained massive military forces in Europe, 
perhaps as much to keep down its client states and conquered territories as to 
threaten the West. In the 10 years leading up to the founding of NATO, the Soviet 
Union had annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, more than half of pre-war Poland and 
substantial parts of Finland, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania. It also forced 
Soviet puppet governments on post-war East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
Amid the chaos, the Soviet Union even tried to pry West Germany out of the 
Western orbit. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, in the midst of 
the Berlin Blockade, during which the Soviet Union attempted to starve West 
Berlin—and bully West Germany—into expelling Western troops. The blockade, then 
in its 369th day, went on for another month before the Soviets finally gave in to the 
allied airlift. At the time, there was every reason to fear that the blockade was just a 
prelude to the forced reunification of Germany under Soviet domination. One year 
later, the Soviet Union staged just such an operation on the opposite end of Eurasia, 
in Korea—and it almost succeeded. 
 
Russian insecurities about NATO expansion after the Cold War notwithstanding, 
NATO has always been a fundamentally defensive organization. Despite its 
consistently growing strength vis-à-vis Moscow, it has never pressed its military 
advantage. This despite many opportunities that surely would have been seized had 
the shoe been on the other foot: the East German uprising in 1953, the Hungarian 
revolution in 1956, Czechoslovakia’s Prague Spring in 1968, Poland’s Solidarity 
movement in 1980 and the breakup of the Soviet Union itself, from 1989 to 1991, not 
to mention Russia’s later conflicts in Chechnya, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The 
involvement of NATO in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the invasion of Afghanistan and 
the bombing of Libya, while perhaps alarming to Russia, hardly amount to a record 
of militarist expansionism. 
Just as NATO won its cold war against the Soviet 
Union, it is winning its undeclared cold war with 
Russia. 
Yet even without military conquest, NATO has expanded, and dramatically: from 12 
members to 29, from behind the Rhine to beyond the Vistula. And more countries 
are clamoring to get in, not least Ukraine and Georgia, both recent victims of 
Russian aggression. Finland and Sweden cooperate so closely with NATO that they 
are essentially members in all but name. Without firing a shot, NATO won its cold 
war against the Soviet Union and, in a similarly political fashion, is winning its 
undeclared cold war with Russia. In 2017, the only other country to participate in 
Russia’s massive Zapad, or “West,” military exercises was Belarus, and the only 
European participants in Russia’s bizarre Olympics-style International Army Games 
were those on Europe’s margins: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Serbia and, 
strangely, Greece. Russia may have the world’s second or third most powerful 
military, but it has precious few friends. 
 
The problem for NATO today is that, for some strategic partners, the U.S. alliance 
may not be as valuable as it once was. After losing 54 soldiers in Afghanistan, 
Germans in particular started to question whether the risk of becoming embroiled in 
America’s wars outweighed the benefits of active participation in NATO missions. 
Secure at the center of Europe, Germany has been complacent in the face of 
Russian threats, creating a political and military black hole in the alliance. And on the 
alliance’s southeastern flank, Turkey is looking increasingly like the kind of militarist 
authoritarian state NATO was founded to defend against. Facing mounting Western 
criticism of its political repression, Turkey has repeatedly denied NATO allies access 
to bases on its soil, and has turned to Russia as a supplier of advanced military 
equipment. It seems intent on going its own way in Syria and beyond. 
 
Aside from the United States, Germany has the largest economy in NATO and 
Turkey the largest armed forces. While neither is likely to leave NATO, their low 
commitment to European collective defense is likely to undermine the future 
effectiveness of the alliance. Yet many European countries still value American 
security guarantees, perhaps much more than they value NATO membership as 
such. Frontline NATO members like Poland, Estonia and—if Turkey continues to 
move closer to Russia—Greece continue to consider the United States the chief 
guarantor of their security and independence. Not coincidentally, these are the only 
three members, other than the U.S. and U.K., that meet the NATO target of spending 
at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. 
 
Looking forward, it is possible to imagine an American defense posture in Europe 
that focuses more on bilateral relationships with these interested partners than on 
broad NATO-wide cooperation. Such a shift would substitute for European collective 
defense a model long established in Asia: a “hub-and-spokes” architecture of 
bilateral security relationships centered on the United States. Whether by design or 
in response to slowly changing facts on the ground, NATO is likely to evolve from an 
active military alliance into an organization that provides the legal and bureaucratic 
framework for a series of bilateral arrangements that maintain European security by 
meeting the specific needs of individual American partners. 
 
Enter Donald Trump 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty is not America’s only collective defense arrangement, or 
even its first. There are also bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the Pacific, 
covering Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand. 
The Taiwan Relations Act unilaterally obligates the U.S. to sell Taiwan the means to 
defend itself. And then there’s the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance, or Rio Treaty, which as a U.S. defense arrangement most resembles 
NATO in legal form. In fact, the Rio Treaty provided a model for the North Atlantic 
Treaty signed two years later. Under Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, “an armed attack by 
any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the 
American States.” That’s right: If Bolivia, which abandoned the pact in 2012, attacks 
Paraguay, the U.S. has an “Article 3 obligation” to come to Paraguay’s defense. 
 
 
As do Haiti and the Bahamas, not that anyone will be holding their breath. The point 
is that no one takes the collective defense provision of the Rio Treaty seriously, if 
they are aware of it at all. Certainly no one has commented on Donald Trump’s 
consistent failure to reiterate his commitment to Rio’s Article 3. But NATO is 
different. When candidate Trump questioned the value of NATO and its tenets in 
2016—calling the alliance “obsolete” and saying he would commit the U.S. to defend 
the Baltic states only if they “fulfilled their obligations to us”—it caused an uproar on 
both sides of the Atlantic. When President Trump declined the opportunity to confirm 
America’s commitment to Article 5 at a NATO summit in May 2017, it caused a 
panic. When he finally endorsed Article 5 six weeks later in Warsaw, the Euro-
Atlantic policy establishment breathed a sigh of relief. As the contrast between Rio 
and NATO shows, it’s not collective defense that’s at issue here. It’s the American 
commitment to defend Europe. And, practically speaking, there is only one country to 
defend it from: Russia. 
 
Like any one-sided promise, that commitment smacks more of charity than of 
friendship. There is no economic rationale for Europe to require American help to 
defend itself against Russia. The European Union dwarfs Russia, both economically 
and demographically. The economies of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and 
Italy are all larger than Russia’s, according to IMF estimates, with Germany alone 
out-producing Russia by a factor of 2.5. Poland has an economy more than one-third 
the size of Russia’s. And with only one potential enemy to arm against—compared to 
Russia’s Eurasia-wide security obligations, terrorism challenges, frozen conflicts and 
multiple borders with failed states—even Poland might be expected to maintain the 
capacity to repel a Russian attack on its own. 
 
Trump has made a blunt point of reminding America’s NATO allies of their own 
failure to hold up their side of the bargain on collective defense. In his speech last 
May at NATO headquarters—the occasion for which was, in a striking irony, the 
unveiling of a “9/11 and Article 5 Memorial” honoring NATO support for the U.S. in 
the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks—Trump omitted a planned rededication to 
Article 5. Instead he used the opportunity to chastise America’s NATO allies for “not 
paying what they should be paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their 
defense,” offering the statistic that for each of “the last eight years, the U.S. spent 
more on defense than all other NATO countries combined.” Throughout a nine-
minute speech during which Trump repeatedly veered from his prepared remarks, 
European leaders looked alternatively bemused and stunned, whispering 
confidences to each other and flashing nervous smiles to the cameras. 
 
Europeans and American Atlanticists are quick to recall the “sacred” Article 5 
whenever American isolationism rears its ugly head. Less often invoked is the North 
Atlantic Treaty’s Article 3, according to which all members promise to “maintain and 
develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” But given 
that only five of America’s 28 NATO allies meet the collectively agreed spending 
target of 2 percent of GDP, it may be that the allies’ wavering dedication to Article 3 
is much more of a threat to the alliance than Trump’s questionable commitment to 
Article 5. The U.S., after all, spends more than 3.5 percent of its GDP on defense. 
No other NATO member spends more than 2.5 percent. As a result, the U.S., with 
just over a third of NATO’s population and less than half of its collective GDP, 
accounts for 72 percent of NATO’s defense spending. Factor in the recently 
agreed 2018 U.S. defense budget increase, and that proportion will soon be even 
bigger. 
 
If America’s European allies spent anything like what the U.S. does on defense, they 
would have little need for Article 5. France and Britain are NATO’s champions in 
Europe when it comes to defense spending, yet even their budgets lag relative to 
their size. They each have one-fifth of the population of the U.S. but only spend 
roughly 9 percent as much on defense. While the United Kingdom meets the 2 
percent of GDP spending target, France still falls some $6 billion short, though 
France’s Emmanuel Macron pledged a big buildup to meet the goal. 
 
Angela Merkel’s Germany, by contrast, has no such plans. With more than a quarter 
of the population of the U.S., Germany spends less than 7 percent as much on 
defense. At less than 1.2 percent of GDP, Germany’s defense spending is well 
below even the NATO Europe-wide average of 1.5 percent. And with Merkel’s 
conservatives having formed a right-left coalition government with social democrats 
who explicitly campaigned against the 2 percent target, a major expansion in 
defense spending is very unlikely. Germany’s defense spending as a percent of GDP 
actually fell in 2017, and is budgeted to remain stable at 1.15 percent of GDP at least 
through 2021. 
 
NATO’s German Problem 
 
Queue a Bundeswehr that doesn’t have enough winter clothes to equip a rapid 
reaction force and that, for one NATO exercise, compensated for a shortage of 
heavy machine guns by painting wooden broomsticks black and mounting them on 
armored vehicles. Germany’s military, once the bulwark of NATO’s European 
defense, is a shadow of its Cold War self. Germany’s military personnel numbers 
have fallen from half a million to less than 200,000 just since 1990. And the steep 
drop in military spending, from 2.4 percent of GDP in 1990 to 1.2 percent 
today, according to World Bank data, has meant that quality does not make up for a 
lack of quantity.  
 
 
Germany doesn’t see much need to maintain 
more than a token military force. For NATO, 
that’s a serious problem. 
Germany’s effective disarmament since 1990 is an entirely rational response to the 
country’s changing geopolitical circumstances. Surrounded by friendly countries, all 
of them economically and demographically weaker than itself, Germany has no need 
for military forces to defend its own territory. And unlike EU members in Southern 
Europe, such as Italy and Spain, Germany faces only rich, stable countries across its 
maritime frontiers. Germany also lacks the postcolonial entanglements that still draw 
French forces to Africa, and it lacks the “special relationship” with the U.S. that drives 
the U.K. to keep up the appearance of a global foreign policy. Beyond the vague 
commitment to European collective defense embodied in Article 5 and an even 
vaguer commitment to the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, 
framework, which promotes defense cooperation among EU states, there just isn’t 
any reason for Germany to maintain more than a token military force. 
 
For NATO, that’s a serious problem, because from a strategic standpoint Germany is 
the country that should be defending Poland and the Baltics against Russian 
aggression. It would be politically impossible for NATO to station German troops 
permanently on Polish soil, but any war plan for a Russian attack should see 
German troops rushing to Poland’s aid. Instead, Germany is trying to rally the EU to 
oppose U.S. sanctions on Russia. Germany buys its gas via the undersea Nord 
Stream pipeline that bypasses Eastern Europe to connect the country directly to 
Russia. And former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder is serving as the 
chairman of Rosneft, Russia’s state oil giant. This is not the profile of a country that 
Eastern Europeans would really trust for their collective defense against their only 
likely adversary. 
 
Worse, there’s no guarantee that, if a crisis comes, Germany will allow bases in its 
territory to be used for NATO operations against Russia. Certainly, if Russia 
launched a full-scale conventional military invasion of Poland or a Baltic state, 
Germany would come to the aid of its allies. But no one expects a Russian operation 
against NATO to resemble its 2008 invasion of Georgia. The Crimean model of 
hybrid warfare conducted by “little green men”—fighters bearing Russian weapons 
but who Moscow insists are independent actors—is much more plausible.  
 
Would Germany throw the full weight of the Bundeswehr, such as it is, into a NATO 
response to a crippling but unconventional Russian attack on the Baltics? If an 
unpopular U.S. president like Trump wanted to use German-based American 
warplanes to respond, would Germany say yes? The answers to these questions are 
not at all clear, but for NATO to effectively deter Russian aggression, they must be. 
 
The Turkey Challenge 
 
Of course, the base-denial scenario has already played out repeatedly in Turkey, 
which has been a NATO ally since 1952. Since 1991, Ankara has routinely used 
access to the strategically located Incirlik air base in southern Turkey as a political 
bargaining chip. The current controversy over U.S. use of Incirlik to support 
operations in Syria does not technically involve NATO as such, but it does not inspire 
confidence. Nor do Turkey’s diplomatic spats with Germany and the Netherlands. 
The increasingly naked authoritarianism of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan makes 
it difficult for other NATO countries to conduct diplomatic business as usual with the 
Turkish government. It is hard to imagine any other NATO country wanting Turkey to 
come to its aid in a time of need, and it is perhaps equally hard to imagine any other 
NATO country coming to Turkey’s aid. Pundits now regularly call for Turkey to be 
expelled from NATO. 
 
The problem is that Turkey can’t be—at least, not according to any mechanism 
spelled out in the North Atlantic Treaty, which contains provisions only for countries 
to resign from the organization, not for countries to be kicked out. So even though 
Turkey has now armed itself with Russian missiles, begun cooperating with Russia in 
Syria and cemented a high-level personal relationship between Erdogan and 
President Vladimir Putin over multiple summits, it remains a NATO ally in good 
standing. In theory, there is nothing to stop Turkey from concluding a full-spectrum 
military alliance with Russia while remaining inside NATO. Right now, there are no 
signs of any kind of Turkey-Russia defense pact, but from a legal standpoint such an 
agreement would not be incompatible with NATO membership. The political 
implications are something else entirely. 
 
Amazingly, just two years ago there was talk of possible war between Turkey and 
Russia in the wake of Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian SU-24 strike fighter that 
strayed into Turkish airspace in November 2015. Russia retaliated with economic 
sanctions and talked about annulling its century-old friendship treaty with Turkey. 
Ankara received firm assurances of support from its NATO allies, but little material 
comfort. 
 
Then came the attempted coup against Erdogan on July 15, 2016, which may not 
have been wholly unwelcome in some Western capitals, and which 
Erdogan indirectly blamed on the United States. Erdogan’s hard-fisted response was 
widely condemned in Europe. What followed were 12 months of wavering, as 
Erdogan looked to see which way the wind was blowing in Syria, Brussels and 
Washington. Finding little sympathy in the West, in mid-2017 he turned to a 
rapprochement with Russia. The sanctions were lifted, the missile deal was signed 
and Turkish-Russian military cooperation in Syria blossomed. 
 
 
Turkey may not enter into an alliance with 
Russia, but it is becoming more like Russia, and 
much less like any of its NATO allies. 
It has been reported that more than a third of Turkey’s generals have been sacked 
since the 2016 coup attempt, along with around 400 of Turkey’s NATO liaison staff. 
They are certain to be replaced by Erdogan loyalists, a development that could set 
back decades of work toward inculcating a Western strategic culture in the Turkish 
officer corp. The net result of this and parallel purges of Turkish civil servants is that 
Turkey is rapidly evolving into a Putinesque strongman state. Turkey may not enter 
into an alliance with Russia, but it is becoming more like Russia, and much less like 
any of its NATO allies.  
 
No one hears much concern in Europe or North America that Turkey is falling far 
short of its NATO commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Relief is more 
like it. Clearly, Turkey cannot be relied on to defend NATO’s southeastern flank with 
Russian missiles while denying the U.S. access to Turkish air bases. Turkey may 
remain a NATO member, but the southeastern frontier of European collective 
defense will inevitably shift westward. 
 
A Pacific Model for European Defense 
 
If the Trump administration decides to reconsider the structure of the Atlantic 
alliance, it might do well to look to the other side of the Eurasian landmass. In 
Northeast Asia, America’s allies already do most of the heavy lifting, equip their 
militaries with top-flight U.S. technology and make major financial contributions to 
support U.S. bases on their soil. Japan and South Korea maintain sufficient military 
force to restrain Russia, China and North Korea, or at least enough to make sure any 
potential opponent thinks twice about upsetting the regional balance. Despite having 
a pacifist constitution that renounces war and outlaws the maintenance of “land, sea, 
and air forces,” Japan somehow manages to spend more than 1 percent of GDP on 
defense while fielding sophisticated F-35 strike fighters and Aegis-equipped 
destroyers purely for “self-defense.” South Korea, facing no constitutional restraints, 
spends more than 2.5 percent of GDP on defense.  
 
Unlike Germany and other NATO allies, Japan and South Korea also make large 
contributions to the upkeep of U.S. bases on their soil. They pay about half the costs, 
much of it in cash outlays, while Germany pays 18 percent, nearly all of it via in-kind 
contributions like the provision of rent-free land. Before the U.S. switched its 
diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979, the U.S. also had bases in Taipei. Like its 
northern neighbors, Taiwan is a heavy spender on its own defense, and would buy 
even more advanced American equipment if the U.S. were prepared to sell it. The 
only real weak link in the U.S. alliance structure in the Pacific lies farther to the 
south, in the Philippines, which closed down its long-standing U.S. bases in 1992 
despite retaining its mutual defense treaty with Washington. A military and economic 
lightweight, the Philippines is in any case far to the south of the most consequential 
zone of American Pacific defense. 
 
The solid stationary foundation provided by America’s frontline allies in Northeast 
Asia allows the U.S. to focus its forces in the region on active missions like 
conducting freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea and helping the 
Philippines fight rebels linked to the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Of course, U.S. 
forces are also there to back up regional partners in times of need. But because 
America’s partners are able to defend themselves against all but the most extreme 
threats, times of need are much less likely ever to occur. The “hub-and-spokes” 
architecture of U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia encourages each country to maintain 
the capacity to fend for itself. 
 
This “hub-and-spokes” architecture may lack the inspirational rhetoric of European 
“collective defense,” but it delivers a dependable system of regional security 
grounded in national self-interest. A European equivalent would see the U.S. build 
strong bilateral defense relationships with Poland and Greece, the two most 
strategically located states on NATO’s eastern front.  
 
Greece is too far west to support U.S. operations in the Middle East, but it is the 
natural southeastern cornerstone of European continental defense. Greece ranks 
first among NATO’s European members in terms of military spending as a 
percentage of GDP, and its island of Crete in the eastern Mediterranean is already 
home to a strategic U.S. Navy installation at Souda Bay. The U.S. can effectively 
defend Europe’s southeastern flank simply by helping Greece defend itself, and that 
help, divorced from a larger NATO mission incorporating Greece’s arch-rival Turkey, 
would likely be very welcome in Athens. 
 
Poland is also one of America’s few NATO allies meeting the 2 percent spending 
target, along with the United Kingdom and Estonia. More importantly, Poland is at 
the same time strategically located on Europe’s frontline with Russia and Belarus. As 
a large country with a tiny Russian minority, Poland is much less vulnerable to 
Russian hybrid warfare tactics than are Estonia and the other Baltic states. Troops 
and resources pre-positioned in Poland would be well-placed either to reinforce the 
Baltic States via the Suwalki Gap, the 60-mile stretch of flat, difficult-to-defend land 
connecting Poland and Lithuania—or, in a real emergency, to cover a NATO retreat 
from the Baltics through that gap. Perhaps in recognition of Poland’s strategic 
importance, the NATO multinational battle group deployed to Poland is led by U.S. 
troops, whereas the three deployed to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are led by the U.K., Canada and Germany, respectively. But a rotational 
U.S. battalion is not enough to establish a meaningful hub-and-spokes presence in 
Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The “hub-and-spokes” architecture of U.S. 
alliances in Northeast Asia encourages each 
country to maintain the capacity to fend for itself. 
The U.S. Army currently has one brigade in Vilseck in southeastern Germany and 
has been scouting locations for a potential second brigade in Lower Saxony, in 
northwestern Germany. The Army presumably knows its business so far as military 
planning is concerned. But from a long-term political perspective, both brigades 
might be more effectively used to establish a permanent hub-and-spokes presence 
in Poland. Germany seems to lack the political will either to spend enough to defend 
Europe itself or to entrust European defense to the United States. A permanent 
American presence in Poland, long soughtby a succession of Polish governments, 
would be more than just a trip wire designed to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe. It 
would form the nucleus of a new structure for European continental defense. If the 
British brigade that is currently slated to be withdrawn from Bielefeld, in northwestern 
Germany, could be relocated instead to Estonia, Eastern Europe might have the 
makings of a viable hub-and-spokes security system. 
 
NATO’s New Mission 
 
A European hub-and-spokes security architecture based on bilateral cooperation 
between the U.S. and Poland, the U.S. and Greece, and perhaps also the U.K. and 
Estonia wouldn’t mean the end of NATO. Far from it. It would create space for NATO 
to continue to grow into a post-modern, 21st-century security organization. A 29-
member NATO is just too unwieldy to work effectively as a military alliance. All it can 
do is provide an off-the-shelf legal framework and integrated command structure that 
is ready to be activated on a crisis-by-crisis basis by a shifting series of coalitions of 
the willing— and able. A rhetorical commitment to collective security might give 
politicians the opportunity to pat themselves on the back for reaffirming the Western 
alliance and defending the international liberal order, but it is materially worthless 
without the armed force to back it up. Most NATO allies now lack that armed force. 
 
Trump’s 68-page National Security Strategy, released in December, found space to 
mention NATO just four times: as part of the “postwar order”; as an organization that, 
along with the European Union, Russia views as a threat; as “one of our great 
advantages over our competitors”; and as an organization that “will become stronger 
when all members assume greater responsibility ... and pay their fair share.” The 
Defense Department’s 14-page National Defense Strategy, released a month later, 
mentioned NATO only twice: once to say that Russia intends to “shatter” the 
organization and a second time to say that NATO “must adapt to remain relevant 
and fit for our time.” If the U.S., the sole credible source of NATO’s Article 5 security 
guarantee, finds so little time for NATO, then it really is time for NATO to adapt. 
 
In an Atlantic hub-and-spokes system, NATO would be able to focus more on the 
missions that Canadians, Germans and other Europeans do so well: education and 
training, capacity building, mentoring, coordination, partnerships, councils, dialogues, 
initiatives and other good works. These kinds of activities form an indispensable 
backdrop for the provision of security. Greeks, Poles and Estonians on the front line 
of European defense surely feel comfortable having a Canadian in charge of NATO’s 
flagship Women, Peace and Security program.  
 
But, just as surely, they want American troops partnering directly with them on their 
own defense. And when it comes to containing Russian or other revisionist ambitions 
in the region, the United States is likely to find it more productive to partner directly 
with the countries that are most threatened, rather than to use NATO as its exclusive 
tool for getting the job done. 
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